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No'ms
THE VETERANS' BONUS-Payment for Patriotism?
The muffled drum's sad roll has beat
The soldier's last tattoo;
No more on Life's parade shall meet
The brave and fallen few.
On Fames eternal camping-ground
Their silent tents are spread,
And Glory guards, with solemn round,
The bivouac of the dead.
Theodore O'Hara, The Bivouac of the Dead.

When war was a profit-seeking enterprise the mercenary fought
for plunder, however, as social attitudes toward war changed, the
motive of the soldier varied. Modem soldiers fight because of patriotism-i.e., "to defend their homes, their property, their way of living
or social group of which they are a part: that is, their nation."' Yet,
some veterans apparently felt they fought under compulsion for an
outside interest (i.e., the federal government), thus in part giving rise
to the veterans' bonus problem. This paper shall deal strictly with the
"bonus problem," rather than the myriad of veterans' benefits.
VirmuNs' BoNus VIA FEDmAL GovisuNT

The "bonus" problem arose during America's first conflict as a
nation-the Revolutionary War. American forces were faring poorly
and the colonial soldier was not the avid volunteer or patriot that
one might imagine.
At that time, however, the concept of soldiers as adventurers expecting good remuneration was in the ascendancy. At the very beginning of the war, in 1778, the Continental Congress promised that
all commissioned officers 'shall, after the conclusion of the war, be
entitled to receive annually, for the term of seven years, if they live
so long, one-half of the present pay of such officers.' Non-commissioned officers were promised $80 flat bonus. A year later 'a gratuity
of $100 each' was promised to all those who had previously enlisted.2

The Civil War occasioned the second bonus payment by the government, paid immediately after the war; years later, political pressures necessitated a second bonus.3 Throughout the South a bonus
was promised to negroes during the Civil War-forty acres and a
mule-which was never paid. But, the source of the promise is
doubtful.
The World War I bonus was the federal government's last bonus.
1 Durham, Billions For Veterans 9 (1932).
21d. at 21-22. See also United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1879);
In re3 Opinion of The Justices, 175 Mass. 599, 57 N.E. 675, 676 (1900).
Durham, op. cit. supra note 1, 22-23.
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This bonus was labeled "adjusted compensation." 4 In 1932, demands
for immediate payment led to tthe ill-fated "Bonus Expeditionary
Force." A great political struggle ensued before the bonus was fully
paid in 1936, 5 even though it was not to have been paid until 1945.
The federal government through various "measures" has attempted
to facilitate the veterans' transition from military to civilian life,
especially after World War II. These "measures" were based upon a
different principle from that of a bonus. They were not rewards for
military service but rather an attempt to furnish the veterans an equal
opportunity to succeed with those who retained civilian status during
hostilities. Some of the benefits extended to the veterans were: mustering-out pay, government insurance, re-employment, apprentice and
vocational training, education, hospital care, legal protection, and
burial. 6 Considering the unpleasant effects of the "Bonus Army" incident of 1932, another federal government bonus seems unlikely.
STATES VETmANS BONUs BA&ED ON USE OF PUBLC NxOPERTY
Although the federal government undertook to make adjustments
in servicemen's military pay during this country's first war, the several states did not pay cash bonuses until the Civil War. Because
Congress was given the power to raise and support armies, 7 the
states may have felt inhibited. Another possible explanation is that
until the Civil War, there had been no major conflict at the insistence
of the federal government in which the states were involved.

Two types of state bonuses arose during the Civil War. First, a sum
of money was paid to procure volunteers or substitutes to fill the
federal draft quotas.8 This type of bonus clearly appears to infringe
upon the congressional power to raise and support armies. From an
idealogical standpoint, the payment of money to procure "volunteers" violated the traditional bonus justification-that a bonus was
to foster patriotism. A pre-veterans' bonus had the stigma of purchased patriotism much like that of the soldier of fortune. The second type of Civil War bonus was the payment by the state of a lump
4 The Adjusted Compensation Act. 43 Stat. §121-31 (1924). The payment
of the world war adjusted service certificates was authorized by the 74-th Congress in 1936. 49 Stat. 1099-1102 (1936).
5See Waller, Veteran Comes Back 240 (1944) for a description of the
Bonus Army of 1932.
6Cranston, From Military To Civilian Status, 50 Com. L.J. 67 (1945). See
generally Federal Laws Pertaining to Veterans 1914-1950, H.R. Doc. No. 78,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); CCH, Veterans Law Manual (1945).
7U.S. Const. art. I, §8 (12).
8 E.g. Ferguson v. Landam, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 548 (1866), aff'd on rehearing, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 230 (1868); In re Opinion of the Justices, 190 Mass.
611, 77 N.E. 820 (1906); In re Bounties to Veterans, 186 Mass. 603, 72 N.E.
95 (1904).
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sum as adjusted compensation, usually on a per diem basis, to veterans who had served honorably. 9 This bonus also appears to infringe upon congressional power; a necessary corollary to the power
to support armies is the power to compensate. If the payments were
to ameliorate the economic deprivations wrought upon the Civil War
soldier by his military service, the states did not accomplish their
purpose. Also, a veterans bonus based on an economic theory of adjusted compensation is out of tune with the political-economic-laissezfaire attitude which was prevalent during the Civil War period.
The states' power to pay a gratuity for past military service in
recognition of a patriotic sacrifice cannot be conveniently categorized.
For example, the New York legislature, immediately after World War
I, enacted a veterans' bonus which was declared unconstitutional. 10
However, it was later made possible by a constitutional amendment."
Pennsylvania has paid bonuses to the veterans of the Spanish American
War, World War I, 12 World War II,13 and the Korean Conflict 14
without a judicial ruling on the validity of such legislative grants.
On the other hand, several states have never felt the necessity of
granting a gratuity for past military service. 15 Only Vermont, of the
states which have paid bonuses to servicemen of World War II and
Korea, limited the payment to enlisted personnel.1 6 Wyoming's bonus,
a property tax exemption, was granted to war veterans since 1860,
but required residency before the veteran could claim the exemption. 17 The reasons for upholding a bonus in a particular case are
almost as numerous as the variations of bonuses.
In 26 R.C.L. §44 (1920) it was stated that "it is well settled that
the public money cannot be used to pay a gratuity to an individual,
when he has no legal and [sic] moral claim to the money, and when it
cannot fairly be said that the public good will be served by such
payment." Therefore, in order for a state to pay a veterans' bonus,
the power would depend upon whether the soldier had a moral claim,
or whether the payment was for a public purpose. One argument
9 E.g., Franklin v. State Bd. of Examiners, 23 Cal. 178 (1863); Leonard
v. Wiseman, 81 Md. 201 (1869).
10 People v. Westchester County Natl Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241
(1921).
11 N.Y. Const. art. VII, §18; In re Craig, 210 App. Div. 732, 206 N.Y.S.
403 (1924).
12Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, §443 (Purdon's 1954).

13Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, §455 (Purdon's 1954).
14Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, §458 (Purdon's 1954).
15E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana. Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia.
'6Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§1542 1541(a) (1959 Revision).
17Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39-7 (Fift)
(1957).
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is that the moral claim, if any, to extra compensation exists primarily
against the federal government, which called the soldier into service
and compensated him therefor. The contrary argument was aptly
stated by Justice Cardozo:
The service that preserved the life and safety of the nation preserved at the same time the life and safety of the states. [Cases
cited.] If something is still due beyond the letter of the bond . . .
state, as well as nation, will not rest till justice has been done. Neither
1s
can silence conscience by referring the claimant to the other.

That the moral obligation owed by the state was that of amelioration,
not remuneration, was the position taken by the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky.' 9
Whether a public purpose is served when the state has undertaken to pay a veterans' bonus furnishes abundant ground for debate.
However, in such a case, the legislature should be the judge, "unless
20
the use is palpably without reasonable foundation."
Some may think the service so far beyond requital that the attempt
should be surrendered for mere futility. Others may think that high
and unselfish sacrifice is cheapened when repaid in money. Others
again may think that for the sake of the economic or financial stability of the commonwealth losses already suffered should be left to lie
have fallen. These are questions of political or legislative
where they 21
expediency.

When the appropriation of public monies is for the purpose of preservation of historic battle lines and erection of memorials to those who
gave their lives, as at Gettysburg 22 or at Chickamauga, the public
purpose is more enduring and can be more readily seen than when an
appropriation is made for bounties for past military service, which
23
appears to be for a private purpose with no enduring qualities.
But, whether the veterans' requital should have permanency or have

a temporary beneficial quality, perhaps even illusory, is also a legislative question.
Although there are no definite answers to the ideological and
ethical questions which arise concerning payments of bonuses, one
18People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241,
248 (1921) (dissent).
19 Grise v. Combs, 342 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1961).
20 Id. at 683, citing Bosworth v. Harp, 154 Ky. 559, 562, 157 S.W. 1084,
1085 (1913).
21 People v. Westchester County Natl Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241,
(dissent).
250 (1921)
22
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
2
"The state may show that the republic is not ungrateful to these men
not only by erecting monuments to them when dead or placing flowers on their
graves, but it may with equal propriety gladden their hearts while living and in
their infirmity give them bread. Bosworth v. Harp, 154 Ky. 559, 157 S.W. 1084,
1088 (1913).
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can look to the numerous states24 which have paid bonuses and observe their legislatures and courts in making an evaluation of the
bonus-payment process. The ideological explanation is that payment
of a bonus is a promotion of patriotism or an honorarium for services
rendered to the state, as well as the nation. The practical explanation
for veterans' bonuses, at least in part, is politics and political pressure.
24 This footnote is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as an
example of the magnitude of veterans' bonuses. The following statutes, constitutional authorizations, and cases are those, ascertainable March 15, 1962, which
either provide for the payment of a bonus, direct the payment thereof, authorize
such payment, or uphold the payment of a veterans bonus in the states for the
wars as indicated.
Franklin v. State Bd. of Examiners. 23 Cal. 173 (1863) (Civil War); Lymand
v. Adorno, 183 Conn. 511, 52 A.2d 702 (1947) (WWII); Booth v. Woodbury,
32 Conn. 148 (1864)- Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 332, 71 N.E.2d 660 (1947)
(WWIl); Taylor v. Thompson, 42 MI1.9 (1866); Coffman v. Keightley, 24 Ind.
509 (1865); Faber v. Loveless, 88 N.E.2d 112 (Iowa 1958) (Korean Conflict);
Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 38 N.W.2d 236 (1949) (WWII); Grant v.
Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 192 N.W. 529 (1923) (WWI); Grise v. Combs, 342
S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1961) (Spanish-American War, WWI, WWII, Korean Conflict); Watkins State Property & Bldg. Comm'n, 342 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1930);
Stovall v. Gartell, 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960); Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md.
201 (1869) (Civil War); In re Opinion of the Justices, 114 Ad. 865 (Me. 1921)
(WWI); Winchester v. Corrinna, 55 Me. 9 (1866); Opinion of Justices, 211
Mass. 608, 98 N.E. 338 (1912); Fowlee v. Selectman, 8 Allen (Mass.) 80 (1864);
Gustafson v. Rhinow, 144 Minn. 415, 175 N.W. 903 (1920) (WWI); State ex rel.
Graham v. Board of Examiners, 239 P.2d 283 (Mont. 1952) (WWII); Fahey v.
Hackmann, 291 Mo. 851, 237 S.W. 752 (1922) (WWI); Kohn v. Bates, 275
App. Div. 431, 90 N.Y.S.2d 391 affd 300 N.Y. 722, 92 N.E.2d 60 (1950)
(WWII); In re Craig, 210 App. Div. 732, 206 N.Y.S. 403 (1924)(WWI);
State ex rel. Howison v. Fraser, 53 N.D. 909, 208 N.W. 397 (1926)(WVI);
State ex rel. Bates v. Trustees of Bichland Twp., 20 Ohio St. 362 (1870) (Civil
War); State ex rel. Bell v. Price, 118 Ore. 533, 274 Pac. 812 (1926) WWI);
Crane v. Olcott, 105 Ore. 458, 209 Pac. 608 (1922); AM v. Gleim, 52 Pa. 432
1866); Bannister v. Soldiers Bonus Bd., 43 R.I. 356 112 AUt. 422 (1921)
WWI); Bandy v. Mickelson, 44 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 19505 (WWII); Stateex t.
Morris v. Handlin, 38 S.D. 550, 162 N.W. 379 (1917) (WWI); Butter v. Putney,
43 Vt. 481 (1870) (Civil War); State ex rel. Hart v. Clausen, 117 Wash. 1,
200 Pac. 563 (1921) ('WWI); Flesher v. Board of Review, 77 S.E.2d 890
(W.Va. 1953) (WWII); State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175
N.W. 589 (1919) (WWI); Miller v. Board of County Commrs, 337 P.2d 262
(Wyo. 1959) (Korean Conflict); State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 211 Pac. 771
(1923) (WWI).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 29 §7302 (1960 Supp) (Korean Conflict); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 126% §§1-7 (Smith-Hurd 1953) (WWI); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 126% §§47
48 (Smith-Hurd 1953) (WWI); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 126% §57.15 (Smith-Hurd
1961 Supp) (Korean Conflict); Ind. Stat. Ann. §§59-1403 (WWII), 59-1420
(Korean Conflict) (Bum's 1961 Replacement); Iowa Code c. 35A (WWII), c.
35B (Korean Conflict) (1958); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §73-101 (1949) (WWI);
Ky. Rev. Stat. c. 40 (1960) (Spanish-American War, WWI, WWII, Korean Conflict); Md. Const. art. II1, §34 (1960) (All wars); Mich. Compiled Laws §35.921
(1948) (WWlI); Mich. Compiled Laws §35.971 (Mason's 1956 Supp) (Korean
Conflict); Minn. Stat. Ann. §197.31 (1945) (WWI); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§197.80
(WWII), 197.81 (Korean Conflict) (1961 Supp); Mo. Stat. Ann. ch. 41, App. §1
Vernon's 1949) (WWI); Mo. Const. art. 4, §44b (1875) (WV/I):; Mo. Const.
art. 3, §38(a) (1945) (all servicement); N.Y. Const. art. VII, §18 (1938)
(WWII); N.D. Const. art. 59 (WW I), art. 65 (Korean Conflict) (1889); N.D.
Century Code §§37-21 (WW I), 37-23 (Korean Conflict) (1960); Ore. Rev.
Stat. §§407.510(WWI), 407.310(WVII) (1959); Ore. Const. art. XI-F(2),
(Continued on next page)
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LEGISLATIVE PRocEss OF KENTUCKY's VETERANeS

BoNUs

In 1959, the voters of Kentucky indicated their desire for a constitutional amendment providing for a bonus payable to United States
veterans of the last four wars. The Court of Appeals held that the
"amendment" served no constitutional purpose, but that it was valid
as a legislative authorization for payment of a bonus. 25
The bonus-sales tax proposal had its genesis in the first legislative
session that followed the close of World War II. When the veterans
returned from the war, some politicians saw an opportunity to win their
favor and their votes by suggesting that the state pay a lump sum to
each man as a gratuity. Although the 1948 session of the General
Assembly was eager to help veterans, as evidenced by a few proposed
bonus bills, little attention was paid to the bonus.
In the extraordinary session of 1949, called by former Governor
Earle C. Clements for the purpose of revising tax assessing practices,
the veterans bonus emerged as a political issue. At this assembly the
Republican minority attempted to force Clements to broaden the
special-session to include action on a bonus. Clements mustered Democratic strength which blocked this move and referred the bonus to
the 1950 legislature.
The bonus issue posed sharp political and financial problems for
both Clements, who was planning to run for the United States Senate, and Lieutenant Governor Lawrence W. Wetherby, the Senate
President, who was looking ahead to the gubernatorial race in 1951.
Had not a conflict arisen between the Senate and House as to the
method of financing such a program the 1950 session might have
passed a bonus bill.
The bonus issue subsided as a legislative dilemma in the sessions of 1952 and 1954, principally because Governor Wetherby told
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

§1 (1859) (WWI,WWII); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 51 §443 (Purdon's 1954) (SpanishAmerican War, WWI); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 51 §455 (Purdon's 1954) (WWII); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 51 §458 (Purdon's 1960 Supp) (Korean Conflict); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 20 §1542 (1959 Revision) (WWII); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 20 §1541(a) (1959
Revision) (Korean Conflict); Wash. Rev. Code §§73.32 (WWII), 73.33 (Korean
Conflict)

(1961 Supp); W.Va. Const. art. XIV, §1 amend. 6 (1872)

(WWI,

WWII); W.Va. Const. art. XIV, §1 amend. 7 (1872) (Korean Conflict); Wyo.
Stat. §39-7 (1957) (Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, WWI,
WWII, Korean War).
It is recognized, however, that the above citations are incomplete because
Cardozo in the Westchester County Nat'I Bank case indicated other states which
paid a bonus to World War I Veterans, but no citations were available. Legislative Research Comm'n, Veterans Bonus-Estimated Cost, Report No. 1 (Ky. 1960)
at page 7 indicated that 19 states apart from Kentucky had paid Korean Veterans'
Bonuses
and again citations were unavailable.
25
Stoval v. Gartell, 332 S.W.2d 2$6 (Ky. 1960).
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the legislators in no uncertain terms that he would not tolerate their
political jockeying with this and other so-called "turkey" bills. 26
The bitter Democratic primary campaign of 1955 changed the
veterans' bonus issue from a Republican-Democrat conflict into a
factional battle among the Democrats. This primary was between
A. B. Chandler and Bert T. Combs. Chandler had been catapulted
into the governorship the first time in 1936 on his promise to repeal
the sales tax Governor Ruby Laffoon had pushed through the 1934
legislature.27 Kentucky had been without a sales tax almost 20 years
when John Y. Brown of Lexington supported Combs in the 1955
primary campaign. Chandler said that this was "proof' that Combs
was planning to levy a sales tax because in the previous session Brown
had introduced a sales tax bill.
Anti-Chandler forces in the 1956 regular session saw an opportunity to embarrass Chandler by reviving the bonus issue. Chandler
forces held a House bonus bill in committee until Republicans and
anti-Chandler Democrats forced the committee to report it out. This
action came too late, because two days later, the Chandler-dominated House Rules Committee promptly took control of this and
28
all other pending legislation.
Since World War II, the Kentucky Veterans of Foreign Wars had
opposed all veterans' bonus bills, but in the 1958 session they reversed their former positions and supported a bill.2 9 There was a
general feeling that if a bonus were to pass and the prospective recipients realized that actual payment of a bonus was a "pie-in-the-sky"
proposition, pressures would mount for succeeding legislatures to find
some faster method of paying off.30 But there was still hope that the
bonus issue would be dealt the same deft stroke by the legislature
as had other bonus proposals of the past decade, especially if the
Chandler-dominated Senate and House Rules Committees took over
pending legislation before a bonus bill was passed.
In the 1958 session there were eight bonus bills pending in the
House and five in the Senate. 31 For example, House Bill 158, which
never came to a vote, was sponsored by Vernan Cotengim, a Covington Democrat and a stalwart of Governor Chandler's Administration.32 On February 25, 1958, when an effort to speed up the con26 The Courier-Journal, Nov. 15, 1959, §4, p. 1, col. 1.

27 Id. Nov. 5, 1959, p.
28 Id., Nov. 15, 1959,

12, col. 6.
§4, p. 1, col. 1.
29
H.B. 158, Ky. Gen. Assembly 1958.
3
0 The Courier-Journal, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 8, col. 1; id., Jan. 21, 1958, p. 1,
col. 6.
31 Id., Mar. 5, 1958, p. 1, col. 6.
32 Id., Jan. 21, 1958, p. 1, col. 6.
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sideration of the Dempsey bonus bill failed, several Republicans
38
walked out of the House ostensibly for a caucus.
Lieutenant Governor Harry Lee Waterfield was planning to run
for governor in 1959 and the rebel-Democrats were confident that
their challenger, Bert T. Combs, would run again.3 4 Chandler's
coalition with Republican legislators worked well on most questions,
but was completely at odds on the veterans' bonus issue. On March
4, 1958, rebel House Leader Harry King Lowman, co-sponsor of a
constitutional amendment bonus bill with ten other Democrats and
five Republicans, mustered enough anti-Chandler Democrats and
Republicans to pass a bonus bill by a vote of 80 to 5. The passage
was timely because the powerful Chandler-dominated House Rules
Committee would come into being three days later and it was
doubtful that any bonus bill could emerge from this committee. 35
Kentucky's House of Representatives had no reason to be proud of
its 1958 legislative record. In keeping with the legislature's general
evasion of responsibility, the Lowman bill was the only one to
emerge from a two-hour session marked by an exhibition by dancing
girls in black tights and a visit by a retired prize-fighter. It took
less than two minutes of explanation, with no debate, for this bill
to pass the House.3 6
In the Senate there was a "rebel' group as active as the one in
the House, plus a Republican minority that for years had been
clamoring for a veterans bonus. Waterfield knew that Lowman's
bonus bill could not long be held in any Senate committee, and it
was too early in the session to hope that the Administration-dominated
Rules Committee could kill the measure. Thus, it was apparent
that some kind of veterans' bonus bill was going to be passed by the
1958 session. Waterfield, as a prospective candidate for governor in
1959, undoubtedly realized that not being a veteran had hurt him
in his unsuccessful race for governor in 1947. Like Combs in 1955,
Waterfield realized that if Kentucky were to develop new programs
and help education, a sales tax would have to be enacted. But
Chandler had spent a political lifetime fighting the sales tax; so
successful had he been that few politicians dared mention the words
"sales tax." Thus for Waterfield there was an opportunity to take
both the bonus and the sales tax out of the political arena in the
1959 campaign by claiming whatever credit would accrue to the
person responsible for enactment of a veterans' bonus and, mean3
3Albert Dempsey of Inez and 14 other Republicans were the co-sponsors
of H.B. 294. The Courier-Journal, Feb. 26, 1958, p. 1, col. 4.
34 The Courier-Journal, Nov. 15, 1959, §4, p. 1, col. 1.
35Id., Mar. 5, 1958, p. 1, cal. 6.

36 Jbid,
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while, to avoid the taint of being a non-veteran by embracing the
bonus-sales tax amendment during the campaign.37 Chandler permitted Waterfield to slip the bonus amendment referendum through
his dominated legislature and thus, perhaps unwittingly, opened the
door for the sales tax he had promised to prevent since 1936.88
The same day the House passed Lowman's bill, Senator Jerry
Fonce Howell of Floyd County, a longtime Waterfield lieutenant,
introduced in the Senate a proposed constitutional amendment to
pay a bonus to veterans of World War I, World War II and Korea
by authorizing a sale of bonds. This bill and Lowman's were given
favorable committee reports and both were posted in the Senate
Orders of the Day for passage.
The Senate leaders obtained from the House an agreement for the
substitution of the Howell proposal in place of the Lowman Bill.
The Senate bill was then amended to allow a bonus to veterans of
the last four wars to be financed by selling bonds and levying a sales
tax.8 The Senate approved this amended bill by a vote of 27 to 5.
The House Rules Committee promptly gave the bill a favorable report and it was given first reading in the House two days before
the end of the 1958 session. Senator Cassius Clay charged that the
bill was an effort to "by-pass the Governor" and saw no reason why
the bonus question should not be submitted to the people in the
40
form of a referendum.
The members of the House, on the last day of the 1958 session,
pushed through, 76 to 4, Senate Bill 296, proposing a constitutional
amendment providing for a bonus for veterans of all American wars
since 1898. Representative Dempsey took less than a minute to explain to the House the Senate-approved amendment. No debate was
raised and not once did he or any one else murmur the controversial
41
words-sales tax.
A year later, Waterfield was in Murray, Kentucky preparing to
open his gubernatorial campaign the following day at a First District rally. In his proposed speech he planned to take credit for the
bonus amendment. If this assertion had provoked favorable reaction,
Waterfield planned to fully embrace the bonus amendment and thus
attract all those who favored it. Apparently, there were at least as
many people favoring a sales tax as there were who opposed it. The
imponderable was: were there more voters against the bonus than
for it? Waterfield conferred with his strategists on the problem and
3't Id., Nov. 15, 1959, §40, p. 1, col. 1.
38

Id. Nov. 18, 1959, p. 1, col. 1.

30 Id., Nov. 15, 1959, §4, p. 1, col. 1.

40Id., Mar. 20, 1958, p. 14, col. 6.
41Id., Mar. 22, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
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finally made the decision that possibly cost him the primary victory; he eliminated from his speech any mention of the bonus and
never once thereafter referred to it, except to say that it was an
issue for the people to decide.
Combs and his organization emphasized Waterfield's non-veteran
status and, by so doing, created the image that Combs was probonus. 42 But, in fact, Combs never committed himself in respect
to the bonus throughout the 1959 campaign.43 However, Combs'
strategists moved to encourage this pro-bonus feeling in the fall campaign against Republican John M. Robsion, Jr., whose political party
was primarily responsible for generating the bonus interest in Kentucky. Robsion should have been able to profit from the long legislative struggle by Republicans for a bonus (and the great fissure in
the Democratic party caused by the primary campaign), for it was
principally in the Republican areas of Southeastern Kentucky that
the pro-bonus forces were centered.
Arguments for and against the bonus-sales tax amendment were
loaded and widespread as the campaign neared its close. Few
Kentuckians were ignorant of the fact that if the bonus passed they
would have to pay a sales tax for a number of years. For Robsion,
this widespread knowledge was catastrophic. The chief plank in
his platform was that if elected there would be no new taxes enacted
by the 1960 legislature. Combs' strategists, meanwhile, were circulating reports in the pro-bonus areas that Robsion's stand meant
that he was against the bonus. The effectiveness of this strategy played
a role in the Combs-Wyatt landslide victory in 1959. Combs not
only swept the Democratic counties, but made deep inroads into the
normally Republican areas.44
The bonus issue proved to be a help to the Democrats in the
voting, rather than a hindrance which the Chandler and Republican
forces had expected. As predicted, it brought out a heavy vote
throughout the State, especially in the mountains, where continuing
unemployment and depression gave the bonus an unusual appeal. But
the mountain vote, in a break with traditional voting patterns, went
Democratic to an extent not foreseen by even the most optimistic
Democrats. 45 When all the votes were tallied the mountains emerged
victorious in the "battle of the bonus."
The controversial amendment contributed to the widening of the
42

Id., Nov. 15, 1959, §4, p. 1, col. 1.

43 Id., Nov. 6, 1959, p. 20, col. 5.
44

Id., Nov. 15, 1959, §4, p. 1, col. 1.

45 Id., Nov. 5, 1959, p. 10, col. 1.
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factional rift in the Democratic party. 46 The pro-bonus arguments
were vague, ambiguous generalities. This apparently was due to the
inherent nature of a bonus and the fact that there were many depressed areas in Kentucky, especially in Eastern Kentucky. An apparent dole had much appeal to a hungry veteran, particularly when
it was given the dignified label of an honorarium. The basic arguments were: prospective recipients were in dire need of economic
help; the people of Kentucky should show their gratitude and appreciation to the veteran; most other states had paid veterans' bonuses,
therefore Kentucky should conform. Emotion ran high in the probonus minds and was particularly directed against those who opposed
the bonus; if against the bonus, one might "sound like Communists
who [cared] not for the freedom preserving servicemen of our great
country,"47 or at least the devil's helper.
The arguments against the bonus were more numerous, based
on both idealogical and practical grounds. The bonus was attacked
as ethically indefensible because military service was a patriotic
duty to one's country which should not be abrogated or cheapened
by compensating soldiers of fortune or mercenaries. 48 Anti-bonus
groups felt that once the would-be recipients realized that such a
bill would impose a catastrophic, unrealistic burden upon a poor
state, sorely in need of schools, hospitals and highways, and that a
bonus would in turn confer only an illusory benefit, such realization
49
would precipitate enough votes to defeat the proposed amendment.
Apart from the heavy tax burden that the amendment promised to
impose, the proposal was obscure as to its scope, inconclusive as to
any guiding policy and promised to create a vast administrative
bureaucracy costing millions of dollars.
The pro-bonus forces, however, won at the polls and the general
attitude for collecting a bonus was quickly reflected in queries received by state agencies within the following week.50 The antibonus groups, although defeated by the voters quickly prepared to
carry the affray into a different arena. A week later, Associated Industries of Kentucky began preparing a suit against the bonus and
the Louisville Chamber of Commerce authorized its legal staff to
assist in any ensuing legal battle against the bonus. The Executive
Nov. 1, 1959, §4, p. 3, col. 1.
Oct. 13 1959, p.8, col .4 (letter to the editor).
The Kentuck-y Kernel, Oct. 27, 1959, p. 4, col. 1.
49 The Courier-Journal, Nov. 1, 1959, §4, p. 3, col. 1; id., Oct. 4, 1959,
§4, p. 2, col. 1; id., Jan. 23, 1958, p. 8, col. 1; The Kentucky Kernel, Oct. 27,
1959, p. 4, col. 1.
60 The Courier-Journal, Nov. 15, 1959, §4, p. 1, col. 1.
51 Id., Nov. 13, 1959, p. 1, col. 1.
46 Id.,
47
48 Id.,
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Vice-President of Associated Industries, Rayburn Watkins,51 was
later to become the plaintiff in Watkins v. State Property & Bldg.
Comm'n,52 discussed infra.
The geographical split of the vote-the mountain and rural areas
prevailing over the metropolitan areas-pointed to the probability of
legislative strife between urban and rural legislators in 1960 regular
session. The rural lawmakers would be fighting for prompt passage of maximum benefits and could possibly look for aid from the
mountain Governor-elect, while the urban legislator, hoping that the
Court of Appeals would hold the "constitutional amendment" invalid, would be employing diversionary tactics and striving for
economy.
When the 1960 General Assembly convened, the bonus amendment had been held unconstitutional by the Franklin Circuit Court
and the appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals. 53 Instead
of avoiding or postponing the bonus issue, Governor Combs, in his
State of the Commonwealth Address, reminded the legislators that
the voters of Kentucky had spoken on the matter of the bonus.
Combs said:
The Assembly [bad] ... a moral obligation to enact legislation providing for the payment of a veterans' bonus, and to provide necessary taxes to finance such payment .... If the courts uphold the
validity of the approving referendum, your task will be considerably
simplified. If, on the other hand, the referendum is ruled invalid,
it is my recommendation to you that you consider legislation providing for direct payment of the bonus and taxes sufficient to finance
such payments.54

Combs made it clear that he wanted the legislature to enact a bonus
bill regardless of what the Court of Appeals held in respect to the
"bonus amendment."
Republicans did not delay the introduction of bonus bills; on the
third day of the session two bills were introduced-one in the HouseG5
and one in the Senate.5 6 However, trouble developed early in the
session as to the method of financing the bonus. When the bonus
amendment was submitted to the voters it had a sales tax rider.
After a five-day recess, the legislators reported that their constituents
had variant views in respect to the sales tax question. While most
Kentuckians were willing to accept a sales tax, they felt there should
be a reduction of income taxes; the mountain people were interested
52342 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1960).
53 Stovall v. Gartell, 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960).
54 Governor Combs' address to the opening joint session of the 1960 Kentucky
General Assembly. The Courier-Journal, Jan. 6, 1960, §1, p. 10, col. 1.
55
56 H.B. 10, 1960 Ky. Gen. Assembly.
S.B. 11, 1960 Ky. Gen. Assembly.
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only in the bonus; the educators wanted the sales tax proceeds to be
used in part for schools; a fourth group was indifferent to the imposi-7
tion of a sales tax; a fifth group was opposed to any type of sales tax.t
On January 19, 1960, a unanimous Court of Appeals ruled that
the veterans' bonus proposal approved by Kentucky voters the preceeding November was valid.5 8 The court declared that what the
voters had approved was not an amendment to the Constitution.
Rather, the court said, it was a legislative act which sought a vote
of the people on the propriety of exceeding the debt limitation of
section 49 of th Constitution, as required by section 50, to pay a bonus.
The Court's decision set the Administration into motion and the
following day the Administration's bonus bill was introduced in the
House.50 The bill was sponsored by eight Democrats among whom
were Lowman, Speaker of the House, and Ray, majority floorleader.
Combs let it be known that he was "shooting for quick payments." 60
The bill proposed payments based on a sliding scale geared to the
number of months served by the recipient. The bonus payments were
to be restricted to "qualified veterans and beneficiaries" who were
residents of Kentucky on November 3, 1959. These two provisions had
the virtue of keeping the total cost of the bonus down, i.e., furnishing
some of the economy the urban legislators desired. These provisions
caused a cataclysm among the Republicans and mountain Democrats. The Senate and House Republicans proceeded immediately to
draft a substitute bill calling for flat $300 and $500 payments. 61 The
Republicans' strategy was designed to split the Democrats into rural
and urban blocs, with the rural bloc lining up behind the Republican
plan.62 However, Combs promised the mountain Democrats that the
bonus would be paid to permanent residents of Kentucky although
they may "temporarily" reside in another state; further, he promised
to use his influence with the Adjutant General to promote such pay6 3

ments.

Former Governor Chandlers Senate majority leader of the 1958
session sought to delay the tax and bonus questions when he proposed by Senate Resolution that Combs call a special session so that
the new taxes and biennial State Budget could be considered together. Combs was quick64 to express his displeasure with this resolution and its clear import.
57
58 The Courier-Journal, Jan. 12, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 1.

Stovall v. Gartell, 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960).

59 H.B. 85, 1960 Ky. Gen. Assembly.
60

The Courier-Journal, Jan. 21, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 8.

61 Id., Jan. 23, 1960, §, p. 1, col 1.

Jan. 24, 1960, §4, p. 1, col. 5.
Jan. 23, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 1.
" Id., Jan. 24, 1960, §4, p. 1, coL 5.

62 Id.,
63 Id.,
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A public bonus-hearnig in the House had been set for February
10, but on February 2, the House committee rescheduled the hearing
to February 4. This evoked the protest that such a change would be
unfair to those seeking an opportunity to appear. Another objection
was also registered, i.e., that the bonus bill bad been sent to the
wrong committee and that it should have gone to the Committee
on Military Affairs instead of the Committee on Legislation. Speaker
Lowman, who headed the committee which referred all bills to the
various House committees, declared that the bonus question was the
business of the whole House. 65 Despite the advance of the hearing
date, the veterans' lobbies appeared in full force suggesting their
views as to how, and in what amounts, the bonus should be paid. 0
The Governor's bill was thought so restrictive by some legislators that an impasse, which could have prevented a bonus bill from
passing the 1960 session, seemed likely in either the House or the
Senate.67 However, the Governor and his legislative lieutenants and
supporters were determined to pass the bonus bill in substantially
the form as introduced. When the House convened on the morning
of February 10, the Administration's strategy to block any impasse was
brought to bear. At the outset of the period for routine motions,
Speaker Lowman recognized Thomas L. Ray, the Administration's
majority floorleader. Ray called House Bill 85, the bonus bill, out
of the Orders of the Day, without the rules first being suspended,
and won quick approval of two minor amendments. Ray then moved
the previous question to cut-off amendments and to limit debate.
A chorus of shouts for 'roll call' on the Ray motion went up, but
Lowman paid no heed. In one breath and without pause he gaveled
through the motion with this chant: 'Those in favor will vote aye,
opposed no, and the ayes have it.' Confusion followed. Because of
the din thrown up by those wanting a roll call, some members had
not heard Lowman's pronouncement. 68

Republicans moved for a recess to have a caucus to decide their next
move; upon being defeated on this motion, the Republicans in mass
walked out of the House, and after they had gone Lowman ordered
a recess ostensibly so the Republicans could have a caucus. But when
65
Lowman said, "This house can do whatever it desires to do if a member
can get 51 members to concur." The Courier-Journal, Feb. 3, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 7.
6 One witness,-who was a career soldier, advocated the payment of a bonus
for each war in which the recipient had served. Further stating, "Don't make
your veterans ashamed of you for penny-pinching." Id. Feb. 5, 1960, §1, p. 1
col. 6. Are the flying banners begining to droop and lie rose losing its beauty
See Brief for the Appellees, Watkins v. State Property & Bldg. Comm'n, p. 32,
filed May 18, 1960.
67 The Courier-Journal, Feb. 7, 1960, §4, p. 1, col. 1.
68 Id., Feb. 11, 1960, §1, p. 1, col 1.
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the House reconvened the Republicans did not return. Thus House
Bill 85 was passed, with no debate, by a vote of 78-0.
The bill was sent immediately to the Senate, where it was referred to the Administration-controlled Kentucky Statutes Committee No. 1.69 The Senate leaders followed the methods used by the
House to bring the bonus bill to the floor for a vote. On February
16, a few minutes after the Senate had convened, majority leader
James C. Ware moved to suspend the rules so that the bonus could
be taken out of the Orders of the Day. When the motion was put
to a voice vote by Senate President Wilson W. Wyatt the ayes predominated. 70
A Republican motion for a caucus recess was carried. The Republicans decided in caucus to resolve postponement of action on the
bonus until a public hearing was held and, if this effort failed, to vote
solidly against the bonus. However, their floor leader was never
recognized to offer the public hearing resolution. Upon reconvening,
Ware's motion to bring House Bill 85 to the floor for vote was carried.
A "roll call" sustained Ware's motion of the previous question, so
debate was limited and amendments to the bill were blocked. The
Senate passed the bill by a vote of 24 to 13, with several of the Sen71
ators voicing their disapproval of the residency requirement.
There were no doubts as to whether Combs would sign the bill,
particularly since the Administration had effected its passage. On
February 20, 1960, Combs signed House Bill 85 and it became law.
Combs promised that he would keep an eye on the administration
of the bonus with a view toward promptly correcting any serious
inequities; he, however, did not confirm the intimation that a special
72
session might be called prior to the next regular session.
Several of the legislators voiced their disapproval, and that of their
constituents, of the "November 3, 1959" residency requirement. A
few petitions bearing signatures of non-resident Kentucky veterans
had been received by the legislature during the session assailing
the restrictive provisions. 73 After the session had ended, petitions
seeking extension of payment to non-resident Kentucky veterans began to circulate throughout Kentucky, particularly in Eastern Ken69 Ibid. A Paducah Democrat and ally of former Governor Chandler charged:
"The politicians didn't pass a bonus bill for the veterans. It was a case of the

veterans passing a bonus bill for the politicians." The Courier-Journal, Feb. 11,
1960,7 0§1, p. 18, col. 1.

When asked how he could tell the requisite 20 votes to suspend the rules
had been obtained, Wyatt replied, "It was about unanimous." The Courier-

Journal, Feb. 17, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 1.
71 Ibid.
72 The Courier-Journal, Feb. 21, 1960, §1, p. 17, col. 7.
73 Id., Feb. 13, 1960, §1, p. 3, col. 1.
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tucky where many veterans had been forced to leave for economic
reasons. Pressure was being put on the politicians to extend the bonus
benefits, but an anomaly existed-extension of payments to the nonresident veterans would be of no foreseeable political benefit to
anyone.
In the late summer of 1960, a special-session call was made by the
Governor pursuant to the power granted him under section 80 of the
Kentucky Constitution. The General Assembly convened in an extraordinary session on September 19 1960, for the purpose of extending
payment of the bonus to non-re 3at veterans. Only thirty-one days
before the session the court,
Vatkins v. State Property & Bldg.
Comm'rn,74 ruled that the Act which excluded out-of-state veterans
was valid.
Governor Combs recognized the political overtones of calling a
special session during an election year, but felt that political accusations and considerations were of less concern than the "moral and
administrative factors that justify" the extending of benefits to outof-state veterans. 75 The House took the initial action to extend bonus
payments to non-resident veterans.7 6 On the second day of the session the House met long enough to open, give a second reading to
the bonus bill and adjourn. 77 The House passed the measure by a
vote of 90 to 4 and then it was sent to the Senate where it was reported favorably and given first reading. Not one word of debate
or discussion was said for or against the bonus bill in the House.
A closed hearing on the estimated cost of the veterans' bonus was
held in the Senate, but those testifying 78 stated that they did not know
how much the bonus would ultimately cost. The Senate passed the
measure by a vote of 38 to 4, notwithstanding a flurry of oratory by
opponents. 79 Combs congratulated the legislators on their quick action
and the special session entered a sine die adjournament five days after
it had convened.
The Veterans' Bonus as finally enacted provided for payments to
Kentucky veterans,80 or their beneficiaries, 8 ' without regard to residency,8 2 who had honorably served in the active armed forces of the
United States, during the Spanish American War, World War I,
74 342 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1960).

The Courier-Journal, Sept. 20, 1960, §1, p. 16, col. 1.
76 H.B. 1, Ky. Acts, c. 1, 1st Extra Sess., 1960.
77 The Courier-Journal, Sept. 21, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 3.
78 State Treasurer, Finance Commissioner and Adjutant General. Id., Sept.
22, 1960, §1, p. 1, col. 2.
79 Id., Sept. 24, 1960, §1. p, 1, col 5.
SOKy. Rev. Stat. §40.010(9) & (5)(a) (1960) [hereinafter cited KRS].
75

81 KRS 40.010(8).
82 Ky. Acts, c. 1, Ist Extra Sess., 1960.
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World War II, or the Korean conflict for a minimum period 88 and
who had not received a bonus therefor from another state. 84 Payments were geared to a sliding scale based on months of active duty
in the continental United States (not to exceed $300) or outside the
continental limits (not to exceed $500).85
EsmATED COST
During the 1960 regular session the Senate adopted a resolution
directing the Legislative Research Commission to study and report
on the total cost of paying a bonitia, all veterans who entered the
military service while residents of
letscky86 Pursuant to this directive the Commission made a report tb'rhe legislature entitled Veterans
Bonus-Estimated Cost.87 From this report the following data were
taken:
RESIDENCE OF VETERANS & BENEFICIARIES88

War
Spanish ....................
World War I ..........
World War II ........
Korean ....................
Total ........................

Estimated
In-State
Out-of-State
Total
Veterans Beneficiaries Veterans Beneficiaries Claimants
1,116
372
684
228
2,400
22,230
5,558
73,125
36,270
9,067
105,374
5,548
291,900
171,926
9,052
50,251
1,256
30,799
769
83,075
259,563
19,747
159,087
12,087
450,500

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED TOTAL PAYMENTS89

Out-of-State
War
In-State
Spanish ............................ $ 130,599
$
80,044
4,297,716
World War I ..................
7,012,064
37,429,520
World War II .................. 61,069,216
Korean ..............................
17,000,236
10,419,499
Total ................................
$85,212,115
$52,226,780
* Average payment per claimant = $305.

Estimated*
Total
Payments
$
210,643
11,309,781
98,498,736
27,419,735
$137,438,895

The report estimated that the total cost to retire the bonus bond
issue would range from $183,783,300 for a 20-year issue @ 3% to
$237,247,020 for a 30-year issue @ 4%. Estimates of bond cost were
made both as to increases in the years outstanding and as to increases
in the interest rate, for each additional five years at the same interest
83KRS
40.010(2).
4

885 KRS 40.010(5) (o).
KRS 40.050.
86
S.Res. 31, Ky. Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1960).
87
Legislative Research Commission, Veterans Bonus-Estimated Cost, Research Rept No. 1, 1960.
S8id. at 8 & 10.

8 Id. at 12.
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rate the cost to the taxpayer would increase approximately $13,000,000
o in the interest rate the added cost would
and for each increase of
be approximately $7,000,000. 90
The uncertainty of the cost of the bonds was reflected in the
1960 biennial appropriation for the State Budget. The legislature
appropriated "amount necessary" for debt administration of the veterans bonus bonds. 91
The cost for administration of the bonus is even more uncertain
than cost of the bonds. Although $630,000 was appropriated for administration of the Act,92 this would only cover administration by the
Veterans Bonus Division of the Department of Military Affairs. There
are no figures available in respect to expenditures of the Departments
of Finance and Treasury and the State Property and Buildings Commission, nor as to the cost of the 1960 Extraordinary Session.
"No one can know at this time what the veterans bonus may
eventually cost, but it is known with certainty that it will be a larger
amount than has ever been discussed as a public undertaking since
Kentucky became a State."92a No matter what approach is taken in
determining the ultimate cost of the bonus, it cannot be denied that
the taxpayer-veteran will have to pay more for the "pie-in-the-sky"
than he received.
TBm CouRT AND Tim BONUS
In 1958, the General Assembly of Kentucky proposed an amendment to the Constitution and authorized submission to the electorate
of the question as to whether a veterans' bonus should be paid to
veterans of the Spanish American War, World War I, World War II
and the Korean Conflict.9 3 At a general election held on November
3, 1959, the resulting vote was 821,462 to 283,902 in favor of payment
of such a bonus and the levying of a general retail sales tax sufficient
to finance it.9 4 The validity of the "amendment" was attacked in
Stovall v. Gartell;9 5 the court held that while the Act could not
be upheld as a constitutional amendment it was, nevertheless, valid as
90 Id. at 13.
91KRS 47 part one, V 51 B (1960).

92 Ky. Acts, 1960, 1st Extra Sess., c. 1, §2.

92a Brief for the Appellees, Watkins, v. State Property & Bldg. Comm'n,
342 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1960), p. 62, fed May 19, 1960.
The average bonus payment as of September 1960 was $332. The CourierJournal, Sept. 20, 1960, §1 p. 1, col. 1. The bonus statistics for the week ending
April 20, 1962 were: total bonus claims paid-390,555; bonus applications received
to date-412,345. The Lexington Herald, Apr. 25, 1962, p. 15, col. 3.

93
Ky. Acts, 1958, c. 48.
94
Stovall v. Gartell, 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960); Ky. Legislative Research
Comm'n, Veterans Bonus-Estimated Cost, Research Rept. # 1, 5 (1960).
95 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960).
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legislation.96 The 1960 General Assembly passed an Act providing for
payment of the bonus. 97 the constitutionality of which was upheld in
Watkins v. State Property & Bldg. Comnmn.9s This Act restricted the
bonus to "qualified veterans" and "beneficiaries" living in Kentucky
on November 3, 1959. 99 Section 3(g), which provided for payment of
benefits to non-resident veterans "who reside in an incorporated town
part of which lies in Kentucky," was held invalid in Watkins on the
ground that an essential element for qualification of a veteran under

the existing legislation was residency. In September 1960, the General Assembly met in an Extraordinary Session and amended the

former act by, inter alia, repealing section 3(e) (2) of chapter 15
of the 1960 Kentucky Acts, thus removing the "November 3, 1959"
residency requirement of a "qualified veteran."100 The two subdivisions of the general classification of veterans-(1) those who were
resident in Kentucky on November 3, 1959, and (2) those who were
non-resident-were held to be compatibly joined, in Grise v. Combs,''
to form a proper integral classification. The court felt that military
service was a public service for which a grant of separate emoluments
10 2
could be made under section 3 of the Constitution.
04
03
The court in this series of cases' upheld a "giant give-away"
of uncomparable scope. The imponderable for Judge Williams was:
What authority has the legislature to donate public monies to citizens
of other states for which the Commonwealth will realize no possible
benefit?' 05

In upholding the various measures, the court reasoned that the grant
was for a reasonable public purpose, stating that it was: (1) a re9 Id. at 262-63.
97 H.B. 85, 1960 Gen. Assembly; Ky. Acts, 1960, c. 15; codified in KRS
40.010 (1960).
98 842 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1960).
99Section 3(e) of the 1960 Ky. Acts provided:
'qualified veteran' means a person answering the specifications setforth in subsection (b) and (c), and who
(1) was a resident of the Commonwealth at the time of entry into
active service in the armed forces and for at least six (6) months prior
thereto, and
(2) if living, was a resident of the Commonwealth on November 8,
1959; or if deceased at that time, was survived by a beneficiary who
was a resident of the Commonwealth on November 8, 1959 ...
loo Ky. Acts, 1960, 1st Extra Sess., c. 1, §(5)(a)(b)(c).
101342 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1961).
102 Ky. Const. §3 (1891) provides that "no grant of exclusive, separate public
emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in
consideration of public services."
103 Grise v. Combs, 342 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1961); Watkins v. State Property
& Bldg. Comm'n, 342 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1960); Stovall v. Gartell, 832 S.W.2d
256 (Ky. 1960).
104 Grise v. Combs, 342 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Ky. 1961) (dissent).
105 Ibid.
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imbursement of a moral obligation, not a gift, but rather a "requital;"106
(2) an adjusted compensation for losses suffered by reason of military
service; 10 7 (3) rehabilitation of present citizens of Kentucky.108
The court on two previous occasions bad had an opportunity to
consider the validity of measures conferring "requitals" upon the
servicemen, but never one as extensive and expensive as the 1960
veterans' bonus. The first occasion was in Ferguson v. Landram,10 9
where the court held unconstitutional several acts of the legislature
passed in 1865, authorizing counties to raise funds by taxation to procure "volunteers" and substitutes to fill quotas for the federal draft.
Two counties, pursuant to these statutes, had issued bonds to repay
loans which had been used, in one instance to avoid the draft, and in
another to pay those drafted a certain sum. The court concluded
that since Congress was given the power to raise and support armies
the states deprived themselves of all right to exercise the same power
to any extent whatever.
The second occasion also grew out of the Civil War. The court, in
Bosworth v. Harp,"0 sustained the constitutionarity of a statute"'
granting pensions to indigent confederate soldiers. The court stated
that "necessarily the matter is one committed to the discretion of the
General Assembly, and, when the Legislature has declared the use a
public one [within the meaning of section 3 of the Constitution], its
judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use is palpably
without reasonable foundation."112 Although almost fifty years had
elapsed since the Civil War, and the "house-divided" Kentucky
had filled draft quotas for the Union Army, the court said, "they
[the confederate soldiers] fought
for a principle and were rendering
3
public services to their state."1
In Stovall v. Gartell,"4 the court said that there must be strict
106Id. at 688; Stovall v. Gartell 332 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky. 1960). In both
of these cases the court used as authority Justice Cardozo's dissent in People v.
Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241 249-50 (1921).
107
08

'

Stovall v. Cartell, 332 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky. 1960 .
Grise v. Combs, 342 S.W.2d 680, 682 (K. 1961) citing Watkins v.

State Property & Bldg. Comm'n 842 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Ky. 1960).
10964 Ky. (1 Bush) 548 (1866) aff'd on rehearing 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 230
(1868).
110 154 Ky. 559, 157 S.W. 1084 (1913).
111 See KRS 206.020 for Kentucky's present provision in respect to Confederate veterans' pensions.
112 154 Ky. 559, 157 S.W. 1084 1085 (1913) citing Ferguson v. Landram, 64
Ky. (1 Bush) 548, 593 (1866), wfere the court said that separate emoluments
or privileges within Kentucky's Constitution (§3) may be allowed "when the
persons shall by heroic deeds, inventive genius, or great mental endowment and
a life of ]public virtue, become in the judgment of the Legislature, a public
benefactor.
3-1157 S.W. at 1087.
114 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960).
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compliance with the constitutional requirements (including statutory
procedures)" 5 before a constitutional amendment could be adopted."16
Further, the court stated that what was submitted to the electorate was
a legislative enactment, and failure to acquire the governor's approval, as required by sections 56, 88 and 89 of the Constitution,
would at most constitute a procedural defect.117 However, the court
on prior occasions had said that all constitutional requirements are
mandatory and powers granted in the Constitution were to be exercised in no other manner."18 While there should be strict compliance
with the constitutional requirements relating to amendment, the
ease with which the court validated the Act as legislative authorization "appears to cast doubt on its selection of procedural irregularity
as the basis for striking down the amendment,"'" particularly since
the General Assembly had proposed and the electorate had ratified
a "constitutional amendment." The court, in an almost humorous
note, said that the legislature's proposal coincided almost exactly with
the requirements of section 50 of the Constitution. 120 But from what
source the court derived the metamorphosic power may be questioned.
Unconstrained by its finding that the Act made no "change in our
organic law," 2 1 the court held invalid so much of the measure as
would have permitted exemption of the bonds from the constitutional
22
requirement of retirement within thirty years.
The court seemed to transcend its judicial role when it answered
the objection that the question submitted did not adequately inform
the voters of the meaning of "veterans." The court said that it could
almost take judicial notice of the definition of "veterans" that the
Attorney General would have included in the question. 123 But since
the Attorney General never framed the question, the court undertook to define the term; certain persons were definitely excluded by
115 KRS 118.430(8) implementing section 256 of the Constitution provides
that the question shall be devised by the Attorney General when a vote is to be
taken on an amendment. Section 3 of Chapter 48 of the 1958 Ky. Acts provided
that the amendment was to be submitted to the voters as provided by section
256 and 257 of the Constitution and KRS 119.170 and 118.430. However, the
question submitted to the voters was not framed by the Attorney General. Id.
at 263.
116 Id. at 258.
117 Ibid.
118 E.g., McCreary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 789, 162 S.W. 99, 102 (1914)
citing Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 600, 6 S.W. 457, 459 (1888).
119 74 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 610 (1961).
120 Ky.Const. §50 provides that in order for the debt limitation imposed by
§49 to be exceeded the legislature must submit the question to the voters. Section 50 also provides that where the debt limitation is exceeded such debt must
be paid
2 1 in less than thirty years.
1
Stovall v. Gartell, 332 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1960).
122
123

Id. at 266.
Id. at 263.
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the court from the category, suggesting that the legislature might properly and reasonably include immediate dependents of deceased veterans within the term, hinting that anything beyond might well be
124
held invalid.
The day following the court's pronouncement in Gartell, the bill
which was subsequently to become the Veterans' Bonus was introduced in the House. 125 The constitutionality of the Act 126 providing
the means and manner for payment of a cash bonus was upheld
in Watkins v. State Property & Bldg. Commr'n.12 7 Although the court
reaffirmed the power of the state to pay a veterans bonus, the "moral
obligation" theory128 was abandoned in part. The opinion of the
court indicated that the classification of "qualified veterans" as those
who were residents of the state when the electorate approved the
payment of a bonus was reasonable since the measure was to rehabilitate present citizens of Kentucky. 129 Consistent with this pronouncement, the court held invalid a provision which would have
allowed payment to non-resident veterans residing in towns partially
130
lying in Kentucky.
The court's test for the reasonableness of the inclusion of four wars
was an anomaly-the inclusion of earlier wars was reasonable because
they had been listed on the ballot and a veterans bonus bad not been
paid before.' 3 ' The payment differential between continental and excontinental service during hostilities was felt to be "obviously fair and
reasonable," so the court passed over that distinction without discussion. 8 2 If "rehabilitation" was the test, then the distinction may be
questioned; if "moral obligation" was the test, how could service within the United States be any less significant than service outside the
continental limits?
The court characterized the financing bonds both as a "special
obligation" and as a "debt" which may have influenced the bonus
bond market; 3 3 in the past the court had held the terms to be mutually
exclusive. 134 Normally the term "special obligation" involves an assessment upon persons benefitted by a service or facility, not involv124 Id. at 265.

125 See note 59, supra.
2
1 6 Ky. Acts, 1960, c. 15; KRS 40.010.
127842 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1960).

128 See Stovall v. GarteU, 882 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky. 1960)- People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241, 249 (1921). See generally cases cited in note 24, supra.
129 842 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Ky. 1960).

130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.

Would the test for reasonableness be: if it has never happened before and the voters ratify it such action is reasonable?
132 Ibid.
'33 Id. at 514.
134 Robertson v. Danville, 291 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1956).

NOTES

1962.1

ing the general taxing power although it may be compulsory; 13 5 presumably the court was saying that the exclusive source for payment
of the "debt" was the sales tax.
Judge Palmore, concurring in Watkins, expressly rejected "moral
obligation" as a basis for expenditure of public funds, stating that the
basis for the payment was "an adjustment for a presumed economic
disadvantage" suffered by veterans. 13 6 He felt that under any theory
the effecting of a public purpose was "woefully thin."137 The "economic-deprivation justificatoin" for a bonus was threadbare indeed;
neither the legislature nor anyone else investigated or researched to
find whether the veterans' economic status had been changed; for
138
many the role as a veteran resulted in an economic betterment.
If the statute was to be a welfare act, there should have been no denial
of payment to certain citizens solely because they were not residents
at the time of entry into military service.
The court, in Grise v. Combs, 3 9 completely rejected the contention
that the Act was a welfare measure because only resident veterans
could have been eligible. Also, the legislature had amended the bonus
after the Watkins decision to include all Kentucky veterans without
regard to present residency. 140 Although the court felt that the measure
was "to ameliorate the changed status wrought upon [veterans] ...by

their military service," it had to reject the rehabilitation theory and
base the holding on a "moral obligation,"' 4 ' because to rehabilitate
was coincidental with welfare. The court satisfied itself by mere
135 E.g., Turnpike Authority v. Wall, 336 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1960); Skidmore

v. Elizabethtown, 291 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1956); Knepfle v. Morehead, 301 Ky. 417,
192 S.W.2d
189 (1946).
' 3 0Watldns v. State Property & Bldg. Comm'n, 342 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Ky.
1960).

Ibid.
Granted the salary may have been lower, however, such things as housing, clothing, medical care, food, transportation, etc., must also be taken into
consideration. Noteworthy is the fact that per capita income in 1958 amounted
to $1,397 per person in Kentucky. The Courier-Journal, Jan. 17, 1960, §4,
p. 1, col. 1. The appellee in Grise v. Combs made a novel argument for justification of the bonus. Appellee's theory was that payment could be rationalized
'37
138

as recovery for a tort:
. . . to pay them for the loneliness which they encountered in foreign

lands, away from friends and their relatives, and what is more compelling reason, for the payment in a pecuniary nature to these war
veterans, for the years of mental strain and anguish which they suffered by the constant and ever-present fear of a sudden and violent
death, or the annoying anguish and anxiety of a soldier concerning the
impending dangers he must surely be called upon to face in actual
combat. All of these mental disturbances and anxieties are in the nature of damages for mental anguish allowed in all tort actions. Brief
of Appellee p 5 filed Dec. 1 1960.
Query: would this be a state or federal tort?
139 342 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1961).
140 Ky. Acts, 1960, 1st Extra Sess., c. 1, §(5)(a)(b)(c).

141342 S.W.2d at 682.
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recapitulation of choice quotations from the Gartell and Watkins
opinions to hold the amendment valid.
Three dissenting judges in Grise, tenaciously clung to the rehabilitation theory and felt that constitutional concepts had been
stretched to an almost breaking point in sustaining payment to Kentucky citizens 142 and that the extension of payments to non-residents
transcended the prohibitions of sections 3 and 171 of the Constitution. Section 3 prohibits payment of separate public emoluments
except for public service and section 171 provides that "taxes shall be
levied and collected for public purposes only." There did not appear
143
to be a scintilla of public benefit in aiding citizens of other states.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky relied heavily on Cordozo's
dissent in People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank,144 in upholding
the veteran's bonus. Justice Cardozo rejected the argument that reparation, if due to New York residents, was also due to residents of California. However, in Kentucky the legislation undertook to pay residents of other states. Kentucky's position, however, was not unlike
that of most states which have paid bonuses. 145 Further, Justice
Cardozo felt that it was significant that the New York legislation had
limited the bonus to veterans of the lower grades because they would
be in most need of aid. 146 In Kentucky the "qualified veteran" was not
restricted to any grade, but rather included all veterans of whatever
rank.
The court said that the Bosworth decision 47 was not grounded on
the fact that the payment was a welfare measure. Rather, said the
court, it was based upon the ground that a public service had been
rendered.148 That the Confederate pension sustained in Bosworth was
a welfare measure cannot be denied; significant is the4fact that the
provision had strict residency and need requirements.1
While the legislature should be the judge as to what constitutes
a public purpose, its action should in some way benefit citizens of
the state and promote the general welfare of those taxed.1 0 The
legislature, however, does not have the exclusive power to determine
whether a public purpose existed.' 61 An accurate definition of what
142

Id. at 684-85.

143
144

Id. at 685.

231 N.Y. 465, 182 N.E. 241, 248"(1921).
1 See generally note 24, supra.
45

146231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241, 248 (1921).
147
154 Ky. 559, 157 S.W. 1084 (1913).
148 Grise v. Combs, 342 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Ky. 1961).
149

154 Ky. 559, 157 S.W. 1084 (1918).

150 Carman v. Hickman County, 185 Ky. 630, 637, 215

151 Id. at 638, 215 S.W. at 412.

S.W. 408, 411 (1919).

19621
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constitutes a public purpose for which money collected by taxation
may be appropriated is often extremely difficult. An appropriation
may be made in recognition of moral or equitable obligations. The
court had interpreted "debts," within the meaning of the Constitution, to include those debts or claims which rest upon a merely
equitable or honorary obligation which would be binding upon conscience or honor.152 If doubt exists as to whether a public purpose was
served by an appropriation, it should be resolved in favor of legislative determination. Although politics may be involved, payment of
a veterans bonus may be classified as a public purpose on the
ground that a moral obligation on the part of the state existed in
favor of the men who offered their lives in its behalf and that the
general welfare will be served by promoting the spirit of loyalty and
1 53
patriotism and of encouraging similar sacrifices in the future.
The Kentucky veterans' bonus was without precedent. There had
been no comparable act in other jurisdictions.' 54 The scope of the
legislation and the magnitude of the appropriation called for careful
scrutiny by the court. Throughout the "battles of the bonus" the main
attention and sympathy of the court and legislature was focused upon
the veteran. Scant attention was paid to the future effects upon the
taxpayers. Even though the legislature may have been justified
in appropriating monies for payment of the bonus, it should reduce
income tax rates, particularly in the lower tax brackets where the
impact of the sales tax is greatest.*"
Hugh L. Cannon*
2
15
Board of Ed. v. Talbott, 261 Ky. 66, 73-74, 86 S.W.2d 1059, 1068
(1935). The court also said:
The term 'moral obligation' has been defined as 'a duty which would
be enforceable at law were it not for some positive rule which the party
in thatparticular instance from legal liability. It has also been defined
as one which cannot be enforced by actionbut which is binding on the
party who incurs it in conscience and according to natural justice.' A
moral obligation' means that some direct benefit was received by the
state as a state or some direct inury has been suffered by the claimant
under circumstances where in firness the state might be asked to
respond, and there must be something more than a mere gratuity involved. Id. at 74 86 S.W.2d at 1063-64.
155 After the public danger is passed the power of the state to express its
gratitude to the men who offered their lives in its behalf is not lost, and the
public money can be constitutionally expended for the purpose of promoting the
spirit of loyalty and patriotism and of encouraging similar sacrifices in the
future by bringing home to the minds of all that if a man will risk his life for his
country, his country will not hold him to the letter of his contract and deem him
flly paid at the meagre wages allowed a soldier by law. 26 R.C.L., Taxation,
§47, at 68. See Annots., 7 A.L.R. 1636 (1920); 13 A.L.R. 587 (1921); 15 A.L.R.
1359 (1921); 140 A.L.R. 1525 (1942); 147 A.L.R. 1432 (1943); 156 A.L.R.
1458 (1945).
154 See generally note 24, .supra.
o I received the bonus.
o KRS 139.010 is the statute imposing the Sales Tax. The state received
$90,000,000 as proceeds from the tax for the 1961 tax year.

